Sunday, October 2, 2011

PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL


" Florida Private Attorney General"

Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry becomes "Private Attorney General"

OFFICIAL LEGAL, JUDICIAL, and CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE and by PUBLIC
PROCLAMATION of Newly Appointed (FL):
Pursuant codified by the U.S. CONGRESS 42 U.S.C. 1988 is now newly appointed as “Private Attorney General” and“Qualified Criminal Investigator pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1510 and is entitled to the full and complete protection of the law by both, the federal and State Governments as a “Federal Witness” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1512 by the authority and protection for “We the People” and of the personal lawful political distinction as by publicly declared declaration known as “One of the People” and by un-rebutted affidavit.
State: Florida )
) Affidavit of Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry
County: Lee)
COMES NOW, In the Nature of affidavit, Commercial and non-commercial Affidavit, (she has declared upon oath),Constructive Notice, Judicial Notice, Legal Notice, Lawful Notice and Notice of Constitutional and Common law Rights that Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarrya living breathing natural woman now hereby claims the lawful and legal right to act, without prejudice, and authority granted and codified by the U.S. CONGRESS as a “Private Attorney General” and “Qualified Criminal Investigator” pursuant to 18 USC 1510 and is entitled to the full and complete protection of the law by both, the federal and State Governments as a “Federal Witness” pursuant to 18 USC 1512. has rightfully assumed Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry the lawful position of “Private Attorney General” for the benefit “of the People” in which the Florida Attorney General has failed to act according and legally pursuant to Florida Statutes 760.51 as stated in the certified complaints previously brought to their attention, I hereby gives notice to all parties of authority, either presumed or actual.
In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, I, / Expressed Procurato Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarryr and as of the political distinction of “We the People” as one of the member to be “One of the People” and a “Sovereign” without subjects as lawfully declared in his publicly listed records pursuant to Florida Statutes 222.17 “Declaration of Domicile” herewith give my authorization and consent to any member of Congress and/or her designate staff assistant, to make a proper inquiry on my behalf concerning the appended Private/Public Bill.

The U.S. Congress’ Enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, codifies the ‘Private Attorney General’ principle, which “offer” is herewith accepted on behalf of an injured party, Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry / “Private Attorney General”, hereafter “” in pursuing action Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry on this appended Private/Public Bill, which is sponsored by a representative, who has actual authority to bind the government based upon oath and federal, as well as constitutional mandates. A Private/Public Bill is an Act considered or acted upon by the legislature, that helps a single individual or group of citizens by: affording relief from another law; granting a unique benefit; or relieving the individual from legal responsibility for some allegedly wrongful act not otherwise available through statute or the common law, including an alleged or imposed “lack of contract with the government,” culminating in a breech of fiduciary duty and lawful mandates, because of failure to prove a contract and/or to enforce lawful standards by those bearing a requirement so to do, under the four necessary elements thereto. This notice and acceptance of a filing fee creates and solidifies a contract with government for past, present, or future actions, as well as providing written evidence of violations to ALL legal standards contractual or inherent by nature to each citizen via the Constitution and Laws of the United states of America, state of Florida, Laws of Nations, Treaties under Article VI and U.N. Treaties, Tribal Constitution and Laws which afford a government of standing, any contractual relationship/basis, or ownership interest in for those bearing a fiduciary, lawful, or representative position of standing.
Private/Public bills shall be accepted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1492 and 2509 as amended by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which authorizes either house of Congress to refer bills to the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims for investigation, and report to the appropriate house as a means of obtaining redress of grievances for an individual or individuals.
The Private/Public Bill for relief is filed related or pertaining to Florida civil dockets as indexed in these public records, et al as shown in the appended Private/Public Bill; the docket numbers can be verified at the locations stated. The Private/Public Bill affirms evidence of multiple constitutional and civil right violations pursuant to 42 USC 1983, which inflicts irreparable harm on Citizens of the State of Florida and of other states and upon .Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry The Private/Public B  may identify acts prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 1961 through 18 U.S.C.1968 and by enforcement, commiting the undersigned into “involutary servitude” pursuant to 18 PaCS 2902 under “full faith and credit. See also 8 U.S.C. 1481.
Both statutes pursuant to RICO and The Clayton Act bring to bear the pressure of “private attorneys general” on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. [Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates] [107S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)]
In rejecting a significantly different focus under RICO, therefore, we are honoring an analogy that Congress itself accepted and relied upon, and one that promotes the objectives of civil RICO as readily as it furthers the objects of the Clayton Act. Both statutes share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited practices. The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, "private attorneys general," dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity. at 187 (citing Malley-Duff483 U.S., at 151 ) (civil RICO specifically has a "further purpose of encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to investigate"). The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by the expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an object pursued the sooner the better. [Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000)]
The “Private Attorney General” holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of her legal expenses, including attorney fees, if she has advanced the policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons. See: Dasher v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, Ga., D.C.Ga., 64 F.R.D. 720, 722. See also Equal Access to Justice Act.
In Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1996) aff ’d, 109 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1997), the district court awarded fees against the intervenor-Attorney General and distinguished Zipes as follows:
The Zipes Court concluded that making blameless intervenors liable for attorney’s fees simply did not further the purposes behind the fee shifting statutes. Thus, Zipes appears to establish the following rule: where a losing intervenor is "innocent," attorney’s fees will not be awarded against that intervenor unless the intervention was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The intervenor in Zipes, however, substantially differs from the AG in the case at hand. In Zipes, the intervenor entered the case late in the litigation to defend the rights of a third-party to the litigation . In contrast, the AG entered the case early in the proceedings and vigorously defended the constitutionality of the statute throughout the entire proceeding. It appears to the Court that the AG took all steps ordinarily taken by a defendant and, in fact, acted as the defendant in the case. Given these facts, characterizing the AG as an "innocent" or"blameless" intervenor would be inaccurate. The AG in the present case clearly played a pivotal role. The AG defended the unconstitutional statute voluntarily and in doing so attempted to aid in the offending statute’s enforcement.923 F. Supp. at 1553 (emphasis added).
We are persuaded by the reasoning of these courts. While legislatures enjoy immunity for promulgating statutes, it makes little sense to provide them with this immunity when they step out of that role. However, when a legislature feels it necessary to perform what is generally regarded as an
executive function because the state executive branch officials named as defendants in their official capacities refuse to perform that function,3 the legislature is the functional equivalent of a defendant in the case—without it, there would be no case. This is very different than the situation contemplated in Zipes, where the intervenor sought to protect the interests of a third-party; regardless of the intervenor, there was an underlying ongoing dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. To read Zipes as
contemplating situations like the one before us, and the ones at issue in May, Daggett, and Mallory, would be an over-extension of Zipes and would thwart the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes. Moreover, we find the Legislature’s reliance on Thorstenn v. Barnard, 883 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1989), to be misplaced, as we explain in the margin. 4 Thus, In the federal system, the Attorney General defends the constitutionality of an act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument can be made in defense of the act. See "The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes," 5 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 25, 1981 WL 30934. If the Attorney General is unable to defend an act of Congress, the Senate Legal Counsel is notified and may undertake the representation. See 2 U.S.C. S 288k.

An Unrebutted Affidavit Stands as Truth

Court of Appeals may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit. Where affidavits are directly conflicting on material points. It is not possible for the district judge to “weight” the affidavits in order to resolve disputed issues; except in those rare cases where the facts alleged in an affidavit are inherently incredible, and can be so characterized solely by a reading of the affidavit, the district judge has no basis for a determination of credibility.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc. 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)
I declare under penalties of perjury under the Laws of God, Laws of Nations, All Treaties, Laws of the Constitutions and the United States of America and of the state of Florida that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my ability.
Sworn to this 21st day of September, 2011.
All of this affiant further sayth not,
Executed this 21 day of September 2011.
_________________________________
Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry- All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
** ALL NOTICES HAVE BEEN MAILED and WILL ATTEST TO MAILING BY NOTARY LISTED*
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice,
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________________________
Signature / Autograph
Stacia Ann Adams II Irizarry
3405 Hanna Ave N
Lehigh Acres Fl, 33971

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